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The third basis for the admissibility of uncommunicated threats
is to confirm and corroborate evidence that certain communicated
threats were made against the defendant ' and to counteract any
presumption of fabrication by the witnesses who gave the testimony.
The law on these subjects is well settled in this jurisdiction
and appears to the writer to conform with logic and justice.
HENRY H. BRAMBLET
A CRITIQUE OF THE TEST OF INSANITY IN CRlVIINAL
CASES IN KENTUCKY
Until 1843, the date of M'Naughten's Case,' no attempt had been
made to state an all inclusive test for insanity If one consults the
six or seven more important historical cases arising before 1843,2
it will be seen that instead of the court tendering to the jury a
test for the degree of insanity necessary to render the defendant
incapable of formulating the intent required for the particular crime,
it has, in each case, given examples or illustrations from or by which
the jury might be enabled to arrive at the proper verdict in that
particular, case.
The M'Naughten Case, however, proposed a concise, inclusive
test for crimial irresponsibility by reason of insanity The tests
or rules connected with this case were propounded by the judges of
England at the request of the House of Lords and presumably were
the law of England at that time as they have proved to be since.
The tests were actually in regard to two main topics, delusional
.insanity and ordinary insanity. The test proposed for ordinary
insanity was as follows: "to establish a defense on the ground of
insanity, it must be clearly proved, that at the time of the act, the
accused was laboring under such a defect of reasoning as not to
know the nature and quality of his act, or, if he did, that he did
not know that what he was doing was wrong." In explaining what
was meant by "wrong," it was said that if the accused was con-
scious that the act was one that he ought not to do, and if it was
at the same time contrary to the law of the land, it would be pun-
ishable. Therefore it would seem that the tendency to place the
greater significance upon the legal rather than the moral wrong,
as was done in the two previous cases, was overruled.'
"1Kramer v. Commonwealth, 8 Ky Op. 428 (1875)
'10 Clark and Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep., 718 (1843)
'Rex v. Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr. 695, 764 (1724), Earl Ferrer's
Case, 19 How. St. Tr. 886, 948 (1760), Hadfield's Case, 27 How.
St. Tr. 1282 (1800), Bellingham's Case, Collinson's Cases on Lunacy
636, as cited by GLUEcK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CiinVINAL LAW
(1925) at 149 (about 1812), Offord's Case, 5 Car. and P 168, 172
Eng. Rep. 924 (1831), Regina v. Oxford, 9 Car. and P 525, 546,
173 Eng. Rep. 941 (1840).
3 Regina v. Oxford, 9.Car. and P 525, 173 Eng. Rep. 941 (1840),
Offord's Case, 5 Car. and P 168, 172 Eng. Rep. 924 (1831)
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As to delusions, the judges said that, if a man were laboring
under "partial delusions only" and were in other respects sane, he
would be punishable according to the nature of the crime committed,
if he knew at the time that he was acting contrary to law. That
is, if the circumstances, if true, were such as to create a legal excuse
for the act, then he would not be punished, but if not, the delusion
would be no excuse.
Within the next few years following the M'Naughten Case,
there was an attempt to establish the "irresistible impulse" rule
as an excuse for crime, but this attempt met with defeat in England.'
In the United States, the early tendency was to follow the law
as laid down in the English cases. Wharton, in his Criminal Law,
Ray, Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity, and other early text book
writers cite few American cases and are in most part concerned with
English law.'
The first prominent case on insanity in the United States was
that of Commonwealth v. Rogers,' in 1844, in which the judge, in
his instructions, practically repeated the rule of M'Naughten's Case
word for word, but added that its requirements might be fulfilled
if the accused acted because of an "irresistible impulse" and there-
fore was not a free agent. The next case of importance is that of
State v. Spencer,7 in 1846, which is representative of the first tendency
to accept only the rule of M'Naughten's Case and omit the "irre-
sistible impulse" rule.
In the fifty years following these first two cases the courts of
the various states proceeded to adopt either the rule of Common-
wealth v. Rogers, which was the rule in M'Naughten's Case plus the
irresistible impulse rule, or the rule of State v Spencer which was
that rule alone. The majority of the states are now aligned upon
the side of the latter while the minority follow the former.8
Although the above classification is generally accurate, there
are some jurisdictions which do not fall within it. In Boardman
v. Woodman,' a New Hampshire case, Mr. Justice Doe, in his dis-
senting opinion, said: "The whole difficulty is that the courts have
undertaken to declare that to be the law which is a matter of fact."
This was the beginning of the present day rule in this state which
consists of the following contention: there is no legal test for
irresponsibility by reason of insanity. It is a question of fact for
the jury in each case whether the accused had a mental disease
'R. v Barton, 3 Cox, C.C. 275, 14 Eng. Dig. 58 (1848), R. v.
Holt, 15 Cr. App. Rep. 10, 14 Eng. Dig. 59 (1920), R. v. Flavell, 19
Cr. App. Rep. 141 (1926).
sCrotty, History of Insanity sn Crzminal Law (1924) 12 Calif.
L. Rev. 121.
17 Metc. 500 (Mass. 1844).
"I Zabriskie 196, 21 N.J. Law Rep. 196 (1846).
sWEImOFEN, INsANITY As A DEFENSE IN CRnVIINAL LAW (1933)
14-17.
947 N. H. 120 (1866).
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and if so, whether it was of such character or degree as to take
away the capacity to form or entertain a crimnal intent."'3
It has been said that New Hampshire is the only state which
does not accept the "knowledge of right and wrong" rule for crim-
inal responsibility, but there are other states that do not completely
accept the rule laid down in the M'Naughten Case. For example,
California refuses to accept the rule as laid down on delusional
insanity," and Rhode Island has never passed upon a test for legal
insanity as a defense to crime.1
The federal courts accept the "right and wrong" test, how-
ever, and seem to place the greater emphasis upon the moral rather
than the legal meaning of the word "wrong."'"
It is difficult to rationalize accurately the law on this subject
in the various jurisdictions or even in a single jurisdiction, due to
the tendency of the judges to use their own discretion as to just
what words are best fitted to carry to the jury the meaning of the
tests to be applied. Fundamentally, however, the meaning is left
unaltered in practically all cases. It is, nevertheless, this variation
in expression which adds to the confusion already attached to the
law of insanity.
The test for criminal responsibility in Kentucky appears to be
well crystallized, although it is true that the discretion of the judges
in the wording of their instructions has tended to create an aura
of confusion.
The first Kentucky case bearing upon this subject which has
come to the writer's attention is that of Graham v. Commonwealth.1 '
In this case the true test of responsibility was said to be whether
the accused had sufficient reason to know right from wrong, and
whether or not he had a sufficient power of control to govern his
actions. This case marked the beginning of a rule that has continued
down to the present day. There have been few cases in which the
exact phraseology has been used, but the fundamental meaning
almost invariably has been preserved.
The "irresistible inpulse" test received immediate and favor-
able attention in Kentucky, as is shown by the cases following
Graham v. Commonwealth. In 1864 the court, trying the appealed
case of Smith v. Commonwealth,' reversed the lower court because
of its failure to include the irresistible impulse test in its instruc-
tions to the jury
1°State v. Pike, 49 N. H. 399 (1870), State v. Jones, 50 N. H.
369 (1871).
'People v. French, 12 Cal. (2d) 720, 87 P (2d) 1014 (1939),
People v. Trbche, 206 Cal. 35, 273 Pac. 767 (1928)
"Weihofen, op. cit. supra note 6, at 15.
11Guiteau's Case, 10 Fed. 161 (1882), Davis v. U.S., 160 U.S.
469 (1895).
,55 Ky. 468 (1855).
62 Ky. 224 (1864).
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It appears, however, that the Kentucky courts have not been
consistent in their wording of the irresistible npulse test. In
Graham v. Commonwealth the requirement that the impulse be the
result of a diseased mind was completely overlooked, as it was in
Brown v. Commonwealth," and in Miller v. Commonwealth.Y" Too
many judges have brought out the requirement in the hazy and in-
direct manner exemplified by the instructions ruled upon in
Southers v. Commonwealth1 It is hardly conceivable that the law
should permit a defendant to take advantage of any other impulse
than one resulting from a diseased condition of his mind; in fact,
in several cases in this state it is pointed out that the law does not
excuse because of an unusual temper, that extreme rage does not
amount to insanity, and other such expressions of limitation. It
evidently is not the intention of the court then that the jury should
find the accused was insane unless he was afflicted with such a
condition of the mind that because of the disease he was unable to
resist certain impulses. The courts are not to be released from
criticism, however, for their good intentions. If any state accepts
the irresistible impulse doctrine, a doctrine highly dangerous unless
carefully administered, the least the courts can do is to instruct
the jury properly as to its constituents. The more recent cases of
Cline v. Commonwealth" and Gulley v. Commonwealth,* have
brought this requirement to the attention of the jury sufficiently so
that it may be hoped that the tendency has now been dissipated.
The most prominent weakness of the tests used in all jurisdic-
tions of the United States on irresponsibility for crime because of
insanity is the incompetence of laymen to find a fact involving
highly techical medical knowledge. Are the courts not being
equally as stubborn and conservative as was the Lord Chancellor
m his address to the House of Lords in 1862, in which he scath-
ingly referred to the tendency of the time to consider insanity as
a disease? We now claim to have a great deal more knowledge
upon the subject than was had a century ago. We now recognize
insanity as an illness and not as a visitation of the devil to be
driven out by persecution.. Since this is true, are we now to stop
and say "The only proper way to find upon the question of insanity
is to leave it to a jury with proper instructions"9 If one of us
were ill, is it likely that he would call in twelve of is neighbors
and take a vote upon just what the illness was and what the proper
treatment should be?
By way of remedy to the above riticism the following sug-
gestions are offered. Let the national organization of psychiatrists
77 Ky. 398 (1878).
"236 Ky. 448, 33 S.W (2d) 590 (1930).
-209 Ky. 70, 272 S.W 2d 26 (1925).
"248 Ky. 609, 59 S.W (2d) 577 (1933)'.
-284 Ky. 98, 143 S.W (2d) 1059 (1940).
'As cited in State v. Pike, 49 N. H. 399 at 437 (1870).
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issue to the courts of each jurisdiction a list of the qualified and
competent psychiatrists in that jurisdiction. Let the court choose
from that list, let us say three psychiatrists, to study the accused
and submit to the jury their findings as to just what his mental
condition was at the time of the crime, such specialists to be paid
by the county. Then have the court instruct the jury as to the
basic requirement that the accused be capable of formulating the
intent necessary to commit the crime in order to be guilty of that
crime, and at the same time instruct them that the findings of the
committee are to be taken as impartial evidence upon the question
of whether or not the accused was capable of formulating that
intent at the time of the crime, to be considered in arriving at their
verdict. This solution preserves the jury system with its advantages
(and disadvantages), but gives this body the benefit of unbiased
expert opinion on what may be a highly difficult question-was
this defendant insane?
Although the above suggestion may not be the best solution
to the problem, it is the author's contention that in view of the
present circumstances, if adopted they would accomplish a great
deal toward improving a bad situation.
CARLETON M. DAVIS
EVIDENCE: EFFECT OF CONVICTION IN SUBSEQUENT
CIVIL SUIT
The great weight of authority, both ancient1 and modern,2 sup-
ports the rule that a judgment of conviction or acquittal is mad-
missible in a civil suit to establish the truth of the facts on which
it was rendered. As an exception to this rule it is well settled
that a prior conviction rendered upon a plea of guilty is admissible.'
Where the judgment in the crnimal court is the foundation of the
civil suit or where the subsequent action, although civil in form,
is quasi-crimnmal, as in actions for penalties, the courts have
readily admitted the judgment.
I The source of the rule dates back to The King v The War-
den of the Fleet, 12 Mod. 337, 88 Eng. Rep. 1363 (1721).
'See note 3 snfra.
'Notes (1924) 31 A.L.R. 261; (1928) 57 A.L.R. 504; (1932)
80 A.L.R. 1145; (1941) 130 A.L.R. 690.
'Duerr v. Ky. & Ind. Bridge & R. R. Co., 132 Ky. 228, 116
S.W 325 (1909) Stewart v. Stewart, 93 N.J. Eq. 1, 114 At. 851
(1921), Russ v. Good, 92 Vt. 202, 102 Atl. 481 (1917). In this class of
cases, however, the judgment is not considered as conclusive evi-
dence of the truth of the facts on which it is rendered. Anders
v. Clover, 198 Mich. 763, 165 N.M 640 (1917), Burgess v. Burgess, 47
N.H. 395 (1867), Spain v. Oregon Was. R. and Nay. Co., 78 Ore. 355,
153 Pac. 470 (1917).
'United States v. One Ford, 21 F (2d) 628 (1927), United
States v. Rosenthal, 174 Fed. 652 (1909), Coffey v. United States,
116 U.S. 436, 6 Sup. Ct. 436 (1886).
